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The topic of fundraising ethics has received remarkably little scholarly attention. In this paper 
we review the circumstances that precipitated a major review of fundraising regulation in the 
UK in 2015 and describe the ethical codes that now underpin the advice and guidance 
available to fundraisers to guide them in their work.  We focus particularly on the Code of 
Fundraising Practice. We then explore the purpose and rationale of similar codes and the 
process through which such codes are typically constructed. We highlight potential 
weaknesses with the current approach adopted in fundraising and conclude by offering a 
series of normative perspectives on fundraising ethics that could be used to review and revise 
the current code and potentially improve the quality of future fundraising decision making. 
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In May 2015, Britain’s longest serving poppy seller, a 92-year old woman called Olive 
Cooke, took her own life. Her death was reported in the UK media with headlines such as: 
“Killed by her kindness … Olive Cooke, 92, was hounded by 10 charity begging letters a 
day” (West 2015, p1). The media concluded her suicide may have been due in part to the 
activities of thoughtless charities “bombarding” her with requests to give money. Although 
the Coroner subsequently found no such link (BBC 2015, Ricketts 2015) a report by the 
Fundraising Standards Board concluded she had probably received some 3000 solicitations in 
the year prior to her death and that it appeared that a quarter of the organizations she had 
supported had swapped her contact details with others (Fundraising Standards Board 2015).  
 
These disturbing revelations were quickly followed up by other investigations that uncovered 
wrongdoing by charities in other forms of fundraising, most notably the abuse of the elderly 
through the application of “inappropriate levels of pressure,” in telephone fundraising. It 
appeared that even those suffering with dementia had been aggressively targeted by 
fundraisers eager to make their targets (Lake 2015, Daily Mail Investigations Unit 2015). 
Such was the media furor that the Chief Executive of the National Council for Voluntary 
Organizations (NCVO) was prevailed upon by government to conduct a formal review of the 
system of fundraising regulation in England and Wales (Etherington et al 2015). In its 
conclusions, the Etherington review recommended the creation of a new Fundraising 
Regulator (F-Reg), the enforcement of Data Protection measures, the creation of a 
Fundraising Preference Service (FPS) where individuals could opt out of receiving charity 
solicitations (Fundraising Regulator 2016) and an overhaul of the Code of Fundraising 



































































members of the profession and instead become the responsibility of the Fundraising 
Regulator and thus be set by a panel of lay-representatives.  
 
Ethical crises have been reported in many other sectors but few have given rise to measures 
capable (in their original formulation) of stripping a sector of one fifth of its (voluntary) 
income (Sargeant 2015). Despite the profound implications, these changes to fundraising 
regulation and the associated ethics embedded in the Code of Fundraising Practice are 
progressing without being informed either by mainstream ethical theory or by professional 
ethics developed specifically to deal with dilemmas in fundraising. As we shall later show, 
ethical theorizing by scholars working in fundraising and philanthropy is sparse and has so 
far failed to propose a coherent normative theory that might inform the profession’s applied 
ethics. What work has been conducted has tended to focus on the needs of just one key 
stakeholder, namely donors. To date there has been no attempt to integrate any ethical duties 
that fundraisers may owe to their beneficiaries, the very stakeholders who are the raison 
d’être for fundraising activity. We will argue this is a critical omission. 
 
This paper is therefore a conceptual paper that aims to fill an important theoretical gap in the 
literature on fundraising ethics. It builds to a new normative theory of fundraising ethics that 
might be used to guide future changes to the Code of Fundraising Practice and other ethical 
advice available to fundraisers. It is structured as follows. We begin with a brief description 
of the development of the Code of Fundraising Practice and its role in fundraising regulation. 
We then explore the purpose and rationale of such codes and the process through which 
codes are typically constructed, noting instances where development of the fundraising code 



































































of normative perspectives on fundraising ethics that could be used to review the sector’s 
current approach and potentially improve the quality of future fundraising decision making. 
 
The Code of Fundraising Practice 
 
The predominant professional code of practice for fundraisers in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland is the Code of Fundraising Practice. The Code also applies in Scotland, but 
since a separate regulator now manages this jurisdiction, future divergence seems likely. The 
Code was originally developed by the Institute of Fundraising in 1983 and provides what 
Nieweler (2013) refers to as the “meat and potatoes” of an ethical code – in other words, the 
details of the fundraising profession’s applied ethics. It contains discrete sections covering 
topics such as public collections, working with businesses, grantwriting and fundraiser 
remuneration, each of which includes some very specific best practice (and hence applied 
ethical) prescriptions. For example, the code prescribes that fundraisers must: 
 
 not accept commissioned-based payments (s19.6) 
 tell the truth and not exaggerate facts about beneficiaries (s1.2c) 
 not try to persuade a donor to switch their donation from one charity to another 
(s1.3.1b) 
 not include a free gift in direct marketing that aims to elicit a donation through 
‘financial guilt’ (s6.3b). 
 





































































In July 2016, following the recommendations of the Etherington review (Etherington et al 
2015), ownership of the Code of Fundraising Practice passed from the IoF to the new body, 
the Fundraising Regulator (F-Reg), which now both sets professional standards and 
adjudicates against breaches of those same standards. This is unlike most other 
professions/industries where these functions are carried out by discrete bodies. For example, 
the code of practice for the advertising industry in the UK is written by members of the 
profession serving on the Committee for Advertising Practice and enforced by an 
independent body, the Advertising Standards Authority.  
 
F-Reg has already made several small scale changes to the code of practice, one set of 
changes following a recent consultation with the fundraising sector and wider public (Service 
2017), but nothing that as yet could be described as a “root and branch” review. There are 
currently no radical departures from what existed under the IoF’s ownership of the code. 
 
Why Are Codes Important? 
 
For Frankel (1989) codes are important since “a profession’s code of ethics is perhaps it’s 
most visible and explicit enunciation of its professional norms. A code (thus) embodies the 
collective conscience of a profession and is testimony to the group’s recognition of its moral 
dimension” (p110). Similarly Molander (1987) sees a code of ethics “as a written expression 
of the principles of right and wrong conduct that guide the members of a group, profession or 
society” (p619). Chonko and Hunt (2000) see codes as important in raising awareness of the 
ethical dimensions of decision making and helping practitioners to navigate that complexity. 
For this reason, the literature supports the notion that effective codes “must address (all) high 



































































(Ferrell 1999, p226). This certainly seems to be the case in fundraising, where the code 
comprises a long and prescriptive list of “do’s and don’ts.” 
 
In his review Frankel (1989) identifies eight potential functions for a code. Codes can:  1) 
provide group guidance for an individual when that individual faces a novel situation, 2) 
provide a basis for public expectations and evaluation of the profession, (3) strengthen the 
sense of common purpose among members of the organization (see also Maes et al, 1998), 
(4) enhance the profession’s reputation and public trust (see also Stevens, 1994; and Kaptein 
and Wempe, 1998), (5) preserve professional biases, (6) deter unethical behavior by 
identifying sanctions and by creating an environment in which reporting unethical behavior is 
affirmed, (7)  provide support for individuals (and organizations)when faced with pressures 
to behave in an unethical manner and (8) serve as a basis for adjudicating disputes among 
members of the profession and between members and non-members (see also Brinkman 
2002). The Code of Fundraising is indeed used for this latter purpose forming the basis for 
judgements from F-Reg when public complaints are escalated for consideration. 
 
Referring to corporate codes, Fukukawa et al (2007) see the initiation of an ethicalization 
process as triggered by one of three stimuli: a change in leadership, a change in strategic 
positioning, or external forces – usually criticism (Kaptein and Wempe 1998). Indeed, 
Messikomer and Cirka (2010) explain that the development of codes for corporations in 
North America has been a process influenced by the discovery of misconducts and the rise of 
scandals. In the context of UK fundraising it is certainly the case that the greatest impetus for 
modifying the code(s) appears to have been public or media concern about possible abuses 






































































The extant literature on codes of ethics has developed from a concern about a code’s content 
to an assessment of a code’s effectivenesss (Adam and Rachman-Moore 2004; Kaptein 
2011). This emerging literature sees the content development process and the extent to which 
the corporate environment is supportive (notably by leadership – Webley and Werner 2008) 
as playing key roles in its eventual effectiveness. Stevens (2008) concludes that “codes 
require thoughtful absorption and discussion by employees in order to become culturally 
embedded” and consequently enacted (p605). In general stakeholder involvement with the 
code and their participation in the creation process is argued to be essential to embed the code 
in a corporate culture. Involvement in this context is not taken to mean only involvement in 
the drafting of a code, but rather psychological involvement where a code is internalized by 
its members and integrated in their personal and organizational identity. Verbos et al (2007) 
see a deeply embedded code of this type as a “living code” and essential in a quest for more 
ethical behavior. Effective codes are therefore the subject of ongoing discussion and dialogue 
with due consideration to the underlying ethical principles that are being enacted (Kaptein 
2011). They are also championed by an authentic leadership that demonstrates moral 
awareness and capabilities (Verbos et al (2007).  
 
There has been significantly less interest in the effectiveness of professional codes, but 
similar factors have been seen to emerge (Messikomer and Cirka 2010). Given the focus on 
leadership it is interesting to reflect on the fact that it was the UK’s largest charities, which 
might arguably have been expected to provide leadership, that were responsible for the most 
egregious breaches of the Code of Fundraising Practice in 2015. A parliamentary enquiry 



































































breaches that occurred during the fundraising crisis (Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee 2016, p36). This blame was accepted and acknowledged by senior figures 
at those charities, who admitted to not ensuring that fundraisers working on their behalf 
(often in third party agencies) were sufficiently scrutinized and monitored (Ainsworth 2015).   
 
In the commercial marketing context, McLaren (2013) explains how sales “sub-cultures” can 
develop that are at odds with an organization’s overarching values and culture.  It is arguable 
that this is what happened in fundraising because the Code of Practice was not sufficiently 
embedded in organizations and the profession as a whole (Verbos et al 2007). Indeed it is 
interesting to reflect that very few professional fundraisers are exposed to the Code in a 
formal educational setting. There are currently 2,578 fundraisers who have graduated from 
the Institute of Fundraising qualification program (though this includes about 1,500 who hold 
a discontinued qualification) out of around 6,000 IoF members (MacQuillin 2017, p10), and 
circa 20,000 fundraisers in the UK (Sargeant and Jay 2014). It is further interesting to note 
that under the new arrangements (i.e. post-Etherington) the profession of fundraising will 
now have substantially less involvement in (and thus ownership of) the revised Code 




Payne and Pressley (2013) argue that several predicate questions should be asked before a 
Code is constructed: what is the need for fundraising standards of ethics, who is affected by 
fundraising decisions with ethical overtones, whether the field of fundraising is a profession 
which should properly have a code of ethics and upon what constructs would such a code of 




































































We can quickly dispense with the first question, since the need is clear and whether or not 
fundraising should be considered a distinct profession is moot since the UK government have 
seen fit to treat it differently from the balance of UK marketing activity. In respect of the 
‘who’ we have already discussed the importance of stakeholder involvement in the 
development of a code and for Wood-Harper et al (1996) a stakeholder “is any individual, 
group, organization or institution that can affect, as well as be affected by an individual’s, 
group’s, organization’s or institution’s policy or policies”  (p9). For Lund (2000) these may 
be organizational members, customers, competitors and the general public. In the author’s 
view these are all parties to whom rights and given and thus responsibilities owed. Chonko 
and Hunt (2000) also champion the primacy of customers but include the profession and 
marketing subordinates in their list (see also Langlois and Schlegelmilch 1990 and Videll et 
al 2003).  
 
But in fundraising practitioners have to address the needs of two very different 
constituencies: donors (or potential donors) and their beneficiaries (MacQuillin 2016b). The 
need to consider multiple constituencies of similar importance is widely regarded as a 
distinguishing characteristic of nonprofit marketing. As Sargeant (2009, p39) notes “in many 
charities there are two constituencies (that must be addressed by marketers) since the 
individuals who donate funds are rarely those who will actually benefit from the services the 
charity provides.” The inclusion of beneficiary need is a highly significant addition since 
many ethical frameworks make special provision for the treatment of underprivileged groups 
(Laczniak 1983; Raiborn and Paine 1990). We do not mean to imply that all beneficiaries of 
charity are underprivileged, but certainly many are and any code must be constructed to give 







































































Payne and Pressley’s final question relates to the ethical constructs that will underpin the 
code. What rules of moral philosophy will apply (Robin and Reidenbach 1987) a topic that 
has unsurprisingly been widely debated in the literature (Lund 2000; Akaah and Riordan 
1989; Akaah 1992 and Taylor 1975) but has received scant attention in fundraising (as we 
have outlined above and will elaborate upon below). 
 
Murphy and Laczniak (1981) determine almost all normative ethical theories in moral 
philosophy can be classified as either deontological or consequentialist (or teleological). The 
fundamental difference is that deontological theories focus on the adoption of specific actions 
or behaviors, whereas teleological theories focus on the consequences of those actions or 
behaviors. Deontological ethics requires us to carry out an act because it is the “right thing to 
do” in the sense of conformity to a desired moral norm, irrespective of the consequences. 
From this perspective what is right takes precedence over what is good (Alexander and 
Moore 2012).  
 
By contrast the teleological perspective demands that ethical decisions are taken by 
attempting to identify the path that results in the greatest good. But the various teleological 
theories differ on the question of whose good it is that one ought to try and promote. Ethical 
egoism holds that individuals should always try to promote their own greatest good. So an 
action would be ethically appropriate for an individual if it is better for them than the 



































































Hobbes). By contrast ethical universalism (utilitarianism) holds that it is right only if it 
produces for all people a greater balance of good consequences (see for example the work of 
G.E. Moore and John Stuart Mill). In the context of building ethical frameworks for 
fundraising, we also need to consider ethical altruism which states, in contrast to egoism, that 
the ethical action is the one that is more favorable to everyone other than the agent (Catalona 
2014, p15); and the latest variant of altruism, effective altruism (MacAskill 2015), which 
could be described as “maximizing good for those in greatest need.” 
 
While we might plausibly apply these utilitarian and altruistic perspectives in the context of 
fundraising, we are left with difficult decisions around whose good should be maximized. It 
could be the good of the individual fundraisers, their employer (a charity), the donor, the 
beneficiary group or perhaps society in general. Putting aside the difficulty of measuring 
good, many ethicists believe that maximizing the total good may not always yield the morally 
correct solution because the total good may be distributed unjustly (e.g. Rawls 1971). In the 
context of fundraising, as we have already said, it has arguably been donors who have 
historically had the greatest impact in deciding whether or not an action is ethical 
(MacQuillin 2016a), but if maximizing donor good impacts negatively on some of the most 
vulnerable groups in society (charity beneficiaries), can that really be appropriate? For these 
reasons many philosophers recommend a mixed deontological and teleological system of 
ethics (Frankena, 1963) and this was notably employed by Hunt and Vitell (1986) in a 
descriptive model that blended deontological norms with teleological evaluations all based on 
what they termed substantive elements (e.g. appropriate codes) and procedural elements 
(such as deciding on appropriate theoretical bases to apply). There has to date been little 





































































Analyzing the Fundraising Codes 
 
At first glance, the fundraising codes appear to be largely deontological, for example: 
 Fundraisers should not try to persuade a donor to switch their donation from one charity 
to another – because it is the right thing to do. 
 Fundraisers should not accept commission-based payment – because not being paid on 
commission so is the right thing to do. 
 Fundraisers will tell the truth and not exaggerate – because it is the right thing to do. 
So codes indicate to fundraisers how to act in certain situations based on whether it is the 
right thing to do, irrespective of the consequences. However, what is unclear is which 
specific normative deontological theory these are derived from. Ought fundraisers not 
exaggerate beneficiary need in decision making because of some Kantian categorical 
imperative, for example? Or is it under some kind of social contract that donations should be 
used in accordance with donors’ wishes? 
 
However, it could also be argued that the codes are actually consequentialist codes.  
Fundraising consultant Michael Rosen has written that the whole point of the codes is to 
protect public trust in fundraising. He states that “one way in which organizations can 
enhance the public trust is to maintain the highest ethical standards and to communicate this 
commitment to donors and prospective donors.” (Rosen 2005, p177). This is construing the 
codes as consequentialist, because the ethical course of action is the one that promotes public 
trust; and actions that diminish public trust are therefore unethical and wrong. Other 
consequentialist perspectives are possible as we shall show later. As the codes have typically 



































































approach has been adopted throughout or even what that the underlying ethical principles 
might be. 
 
Pressure in Fundraising: An Ethical Case. 
 
An example will illustrate the difficulty. The Association of Fundraising Professionals’ 
International Statement on Ethical Principles in Fundraising (AFP 2017) states that: “Funds 
will be collected carefully and with respect of donor’s free choice, without the use of 
pressure, harassment, intimidation or coercion.” 
 
By contrast in England, the Code of Fundraising Practice states that nonprofit organizations 
“must not engage in fundraising which…places undue pressure on a person to donate” 
(Fundraising Regulator 2017, s1.2f – emphasis added). This mirrors the legal language of the 
Charities Act 2006 (s64A(4)(c)), which contains a “reserve power” for the introduction of 
statutory regulation, which would allow the relevant government minister to set regulations 
that prevent undue pressure being applied. 
 
The first thing to note is the ambiguity regarding the term “pressure”. The AFP code does not 
define “pressure” but it does say that no pressure (however defined) should be exerted on a 
donor. This creates a strict liability offence. As long as a person states that “pressure” has 
been applied, the fundraiser has by definition breached their professional ethical and best 
practice standards, irrespective of any debate about whether some sorts of pressure, such as 
any moral pressure that might be felt/exerted through the use of stark images, may be 




































































If fundraisers are not allowed to apply “undue” pressure, then it implies that some sort of 
pressure is “due” – in other words, allowable or “permissible”, although what constitutes 
pressure and how much of this is permissible is not defined anywhere.  
 
So we have two ethical standards in Britain and America that don’t align. British fundraisers 
must not put donors under undue pressure to donate; but American fundraisers must not put 
them under any pressure at all. 
 
There are further complexities. The pressure some individuals feel might be because a 
fundraiser stopped them on the street, grabbed hold of their arm and called them heartless for 
ignoring starving children. Or it might be that the person felt pressured because the charity 
called them on the anniversary of their gift to ask them to renew at a time that was genuinely 
inconvenient for them. Or it might be the person felt pressured because they saw a television 
advertisement and felt that they ought to do something but couldn’t really afford it and that 
made them feel guilty. For some, the very act of being asked to give at all might constitute 
not just pressure, but pressure that they consider to be undue.  
 
No attempt had been made to clarify these issues until the Fundraising Regulator conducted 
focus groups with members of the public as part of its first review of the Code of Fundraising 
Practice (Caffery 2017). This research attempted to ascertain what the public considered to be 
approaches that subjected them to undue pressure, finding that “undue pressure was deemed 
to have been applied” when a fundraiser sought to (ibid, 23-24): 
 
 prompt the potential donor with a high suggested donation and not appropriately adjust 



































































 referenced the potential donor’s personal life in order to provoke feelings of guilt 
 refuse to actively listen to and observe the information provided by the potential donor 
during the exchange 
 induce a sense of overt urgency in the interaction 
 adopt an aggressive or overly sales-led style.   
 
However, even though this goes some way to identifying what the British public believes 
constitutes undue pressure, it cannot automatically be inferred that this level of “undueness” 
is unethical. It would be wrong to assume that the British public is the only voice that should 
be heard in making that determination as we shall explain below.  
 
This isn’t to say that it is ethical to put pressure on someone to donate; only that it is not self-
evident that it is unethical. For a code to be effective, resolutions to this dilemma and others 
like it, have to be arrived at using some kind of ethical decision making process. But what 
should such a process or framework look like? To resolve these ethical grey areas in applied 
fundraising ethics, we need to apply not just a normative ethical theory such as utilitarianism, 
altruism or Kantian ethics, but a theory of normative fundraising ethics that has been adopted 
specifically for this purpose, and then develop a decision making framework specific to that 




For a subject that is so vitally important to the profession, fundraising ethics has received 
surprisingly little attention. There was initial interest in the early- to mid-1990s when a 



































































O’Neil 1997) appeared. There have also been two books devoted to the topic of fundraising 
ethics (Anderson 1996, Fischer 2000), both of which are books about applied ethics but 
develop little in the way of normative theory. It is worth noting that since then only two 
scholarly articles have been printed (Clohesy 2003, Rosen 2005). It therefore seems fair to 
infer that the fundraising academy has largely ignored the topic of fundraising ethics. Where 
the literature does talk about ethics and fundraising, it tends to refer to the ethical 
implications of particular types of fundraising, such as cause related marketing (Chaney & 
Dolli 2001; Eikenberry 2009), or ethics is mentioned tangentially, for example, in how legal 
ethics relate to legacy (bequest) solicitations (McGregor-Lowndes & Hannah 2012).  
 
The lack of academic interest aside, it is possible to tease out three coherent sets of ideas 
from the professional and academic literature that could serve as the bases for normative 
theories of fundraising ethics. These are: 
 
1. Protection of public trust or “trustism” 
2. Servicing the donor’s needs, wants and aspirations (donorcentrism)  






As previously highlighted, stewardship of the public trust is the bedrock of many ethical 
codes. A ‘trustist’ approach has featured prominently in much of the early thinking about 



































































trust is a “fundamental principle [that] underscores the centrality of ethical relationships to 
fundraising”; while Rosen (2005, p177) notes that organizations can enhance this public trust 
by “maintain[ing] the highest ethical standards and to communicate this commitment to 
donors and prospective donors”.  
 
In the 1980s, the Josephson Institute for the Advancement of Ethics argued that a study of the 
history and philosophy of religion suggests there are 10 core values that transcend cultures 
and therefore establish ethical norms:  honesty, integrity, promise-keeping, fidelity/loyalty, 
fairness, caring for others, respect for others, responsible citizenship, pursuit of excellence, 
and accountability (Marion 1994, pp51-52). Delivering a paper to the NSFRE’s (the 
forerunner of the Association of Fundraising Professionals in the USA) National Forum on 
Fundraising Ethics in 1988, the Institute’s founder, Michael Josephson, added an eleventh 
value for nonprofit organizations and their fundraising departments: safeguarding the public 
trust (ibid p52). Similarly, Independent Sector (2002) – the national voice of the US nonprofit 
sector – tells us: “Those who presume to serve the public good must assume the public trust.” 
 
There have been numerous studies that support the critical notion of trust in this context. 
Trust in the nonprofit sector appears to drive whether individuals will become donors 
(Sargeant and Lee 2002) and trust in specific organizations seems to drive facets of giving 
behavior, notably subsequent loyalty and retention (Sargeant and Lee 2004). 
 
So under a consequentialist ‘trustist’ approach to fundraising ethics: 
 
Fundraising is ethical when it promotes, sustains, protects or maintains public trust, and 




































































Any ethical decision making framework based on trustist ethics would therefore need to 
assess the impact on public trust. From this perspective, ethical provisions contained in the 
codes exist to promote, protect and maintain public trust in fundraising practices and the 





Donorcentrism is a collection of ideas that all share the common theme of caring for the 
donor’s interests and concerns by putting them at the “heart” of charity communications (e.g. 
Orland 2011, Pegram 2016) or at the “centre of fundraising strategies” (Etherington et al 
2015, p63). Although donorcentrism has largely emanated from professional practice, the 
notion of putting the donor first has considerable support in the academic literature of the 
early- to mid-1990s. For example, Geever (1994, p70) talks about the “ethical belief” in 
“recognizing that the donor comes first”; while Marion (1994, p55) describes the “special 
duty” that fundraisers have to represent their donors’ interests. 
 
Donorcentrism is a key component of ‘relationship fundraising’, an idea developed by British 
fundraiser Ken Burnett in the early 1990s, which he defines as (2002, p38): 
 
“An approach to the marketing of a cause that centres on the unique and special relationship 
between a nonprofit and each supporter. Its overriding consideration is to care for and 



































































therefore geared toward making sure donors know they are important, valued, and 
considered, which has the effect of maximizing funds per donor in the long term.”  
 
Burnett’s definition suggests that he views donorcentrism as a consequentialist doctrine since 
the point of putting the donor at the heart of the a charity’s communications is because this 
raises more sustainable income over the long term than using purely transactional fundraising 
techniques. Other authors concur (see for example Ahern and Joyaux 2007 and Craver 2014). 
 
From a consequentialist perspective on donorcentrsim we may conclude: 
 
Fundraising is ethical when it gives priority to the donor’s wants, needs, and wishes provided 
that this maximizes sustainable income for the nonprofit. 
 
However, a second perspective is also reflected in the literature. Some fundraisers see 
donorcentrism as a deontological approach to fundraising ethics. From this perspective 
fundraisers ought to put their donors interest at the heart of what they do because that is a 
desired moral social norm and the right thing to do in and of itself, irrespective of whether it 
raises more money. Nathan and Tempel (2008), for example, remind fundraisers that they 
have “an ethical duty to collect and store only that such data as they need for the purposes of 
fundraising and to ensure that the data they collect is used only for that purpose and not 
shared with third parties.” Similarly Kay Sprinkel Grace (2005) has argued that donors give 
through organizations rather than to organizations and that donor needs should thus form the 
bedrock of fundraising communication and approaches. The justification in each of these 
examples is that acting in this way is the right thing to do and/or the right way to treat 




































































So from this deontological perspective:  
 
Fundraising is ethical when it gives priority to the donor’s wants, needs, desires and wishes.  
 
A consequentialist donorcentrist fundraiser views the quality of the donor relationship as a 
means to generating income; a deontological donorcentrist fundraiser cares about the quality 
of the relationship as an end in itself. Choosing which of these approaches to adopt is itself a 
moral dilemma for a fundraiser, because one might raise less money than the other. 
 
 
Service of philanthropy 
 
An additional normative ethical theory of fundraising extends donorcentrism to focus almost 
entirely on the wellbeing and “growth” of the donor. The idea that fundraising is the servant 
of philanthropy was proposed by American fundraising expert Hank Rosso, who writes that 
(Cited in Tempel 2003a, p4): “fundraising is justified when it is used as a responsible 
invitation guiding contributors to make the kind of gift that will meet their own special needs 
and add greater meaning to their lives.” So this is a very clear normative statement about how 
fundraising ought to be practiced. It is consequentialist (teleological) because is clearly states 
that the right course of action for a fundraiser is the one that results in consequences that meet 
the donors’ needs and bring meaning to them. It strongly implies that fundraising is only 
justified when it brings “meaning” to donors’ philanthropy, and it is unjustified when it 
doesn’t. Similarly, O’Neil (1994, p4) sees fundraisers as “moral trainers” for philanthropists, 



































































the right amounts at the right time” (ibid, pp4-5). He says the “moral significance” of 
fundraising is therefore to encourage people to become more generous (ibid, p6) by 
“cultivation of the general habit of altruism” (ibid, p7). 
 
This is a different approach to trustism and consequentialist (teleological) donorcentrism. 
With those two approaches, the point of ethical fundraising is to protect the sustainability of 
long-term income generation. However, with the service of philanthropy ethic, the objective 
is not to raise money for the nonprofit, but to ensure that the donor is fulfilled by his/her 
philanthropy. If a fundraiser wants to ask for a gift that would not be ‘meaningful’ to the 
donor, then she ought not do it, irrespective of the outcome to organization. To do so would 
be to act unethically. It also differs in aspect from a consequentialist perspective on 
donorcentrism because the focus is on the generation of meaning and the growth of self, 
which may or may not involve giving to (or through) a particular organization.  
 
Thus under service of philanthropy ethics: 
 





Rights balancing fundraising ethics 
 
What is striking in most of the literature on fundraising ethics is that the beneficiary or 



































































shows each of the normative theories of fundraising ethics (and their variants) tabularized to 
show primary and secondary duties of fundraisers. None of the theories developed during the 
1990s specifies that fundraisers owe any specific or particular duty to their organization’s 
beneficiaries or service users.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
 
This is a remarkable omission since the concept of utility dictates that the decision maker will 
“actively seek information on the impact its decisions will have on all parties (our emphasis) 
and will weigh this information” (Raiborn and Payne 1990, 885-6) (See also Payne and 
Pressley 2013). The weight placed on the needs of particular stakeholders could vary, but we 
might reasonably expect that what Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell (1982) refer to as the 
“organizational distance” between the decision maker and each stakeholder would play a 
pivotal role in defining priorities. As nonprofit organizations exist to save or enrich the lives 
of focal beneficiaries, the omission of the interests of these groups in ethical decision making 
seems somehow inappropriate. As Rosso, notes, “organizations of the independent sector 
come into existence for the purpose of responding to some facet of human or societal needs… 
the cause provides moral justification for moral intervention and that provides the 
justification for fundraising” (Rosso 1991 p4). 
 
By overlooking or ignoring the interests of the beneficiary, ethical theorizing has neglected to 
formally state that fundraisers have an ethical duty to beneficiaries – specifically to ensure 
the organizations they work for have sufficient funds to provide services for beneficiaries. 



































































income. They may also have failed ethically if their professional failure were due to not 
giving appropriate consideration to the interests of their beneficiaries. 
 
Adopting this perspective, rights-balancing fundraising ethics suggests that: 
 
Fundraising is ethical when it balances the duty of fundraisers to solicit support on behalf of 
their beneficiaries, with the relevant rights of the donor. 
 
Donor rights here might include the right not to be subjected to (undue) pressure to donate 
and anything else that a donor might consider unethical, such as guilt, unreasonable intrusion 
into privacy, unreasonably high fundraising costs, etc, some of which are suggested by the 
research conducted by Caffery (2017) that we referred to earlier.  
 
 
Illustrating Different Perspectives: The Case of Guilt 
 
Many ethical dilemmas in fundraising arise because of a tension between what the donor 
wants (often asking less, asking in different ways, or simply not asking at all) and what the 
fundraiser needs to do on behalf of their beneficiaries (asking in the most effective and 
efficient ways to ensure enough money to provide services). Yet until now, fundraising’s 
professional ethics has failed to address this very direct ethical tension, preferring instead to 
do it by the proxy of public trust, donor wants and desires, and meaningful philanthropy. 
 
Consider the general ethical question of whether it is appropriate for donors to feel guilty if 



































































be a form of undue pressure (Caffery 2017, pp23-24). How might each of these normative 
theories of fundraising ethics deal with this question? Might it be acceptable for a donor to 
feel guilty if they don’t give? 
 
Trustism – No. It could be argued that making donors feel guilty would undermine public 
trust in the long-term, thus jeopardizing long-term sustainable income. So making people feel 
guilty would be unethical and anything that did this such as seemingly expensive enclosures 
in direct mail packs or the use of language that was deliberately guilt provoking, would be 
prohibited by the codes (Pidgeon 2013). As a consequentialist theory, such ethical decision 
making would need to be supported by evidence of the likely impact on public trust. 
 
Donorcentrism (consequentialist) – No. Making people feel guilty, whether intentionally or 
not, could make them less likely to give again. Although it might produce short-term gain, in 
the long run, people will probably give less (Burnett 2002). So making people feel guilty is 
unethical and the codes would be designed to prevent this, such as with provisions relating to 
the use of shocking images in advertising. As a consequentialist theory, this will also require 
supporting evidence. 
 
Donorcentrism (deontological) – No. Feeling guilty about not giving to charity is not in 
donors’ interests and would evoke negative emotion (Shang and Sargeant 2018). It is simply 
the wrong thing to do to make people feel guilty, whether intentionally or not. So any 
fundraising that did this would probably be considered unethical. 
 
Service of philanthropy – No. A donor cannot experience meaning in their philanthropy if 



































































contribute to their personal sense of wellbeing. The use of guilt in a solicitation is therefore 
unethical.   
 
Rights balancing – Possibly. All the above theories provide a general rule, based on moral 
norms or likely consequences, regarding guilt in fundraising, with the probable conclusion 
that it would be unethical. Only rights balancing ethics would consider each case in context, 
perhaps concluding that feelings of guilt as an undesired by-product of declining a 
solicitation or even the deliberate inducement of guilt were at times acceptable. Perhaps the 
approach did leave some people feeling guilty, but not enough to outweigh the good that the 
money raised delivered for beneficiaries. Perhaps in the case of an emergency appeal, in 
particular, some guilt-inducement may be acceptable and perhaps even required. 
 
Note that we say “may.” It may well be that on the vast majority of occasions, the ethical 
decision making framework will err on the side of the donor. But there may be times when it 
does not. When that happens, rights balancing decision-making frameworks will have 
provided a very good ethical justification why that should be the case. 
 
Before we leave rights balancing fundraising ethics, it is important to state in no uncertain 
terms what it is not. It is not an ethical justification to do anything, just because it raises more 
money. Rights balancing ethics is a genuine attempt to ensure that by doing right by their 
donors, fundraisers don’t disadvantage their beneficiaries, the very people they exist to 
support. In doing so, it provides a framework by which fundraisers can be answerable to their 







































































In this article we have proposed a new normative theory of fundraising ethics that could be 
applied in the derivation of ethical guidance provided to the profession of fundraising. 
Further work will now be necessary to operationalize this theoretical perspective into a 
decision-making framework. To this end, further research would be helpful to explore the 
issue of “balance” and how differing impacts and opinions might be appropriately weighted. 
Additional work is also warranted to explore beneficiary perceptions of specific fundraising 
practices (along the lines already conducted by Warrington and Crombie, 2017), where the 
boundaries of acceptability might lie (and why) and how these perceptions might differ from 




Sama and Shoaf (2008) remind us that “being a professional is a privilege, not a right, and 
that one must continue to earn the privilege conferred on the profession by society. To do so 
requires attention to the duties implicit in the reciprocal relationship between the professional 
and the client constituting the moral community in which they transact business” (p44-45). 
There can be little doubt that as a profession, fundraising has been lacking in this regard and 
has a lot to do to “clean up its act” following the disclosure of serious ethical lapses, notably 
around the solicitation of vulnerable people.  
 
But rather than create a further series of knee-jerk and bespoke adjustments to the codes, we 
have argued instead for a systematic review and in particular consideration of the underlying 



































































has repeatedly said that its role is to represent the voice of the donor, or to ‘speak up for’ 
donors (Birkwood 2016a), and that the public will be consulted on changes to the fundraising 
code of practice (Birkwood 2016b). The recent research conducted by F-Reg (Caffery 2017) 
hints at the kinds of things the regulator might consider when representing donors in making 
changes to the code.  
  
But as we stated previously, fundraisers are unlike commercial marketers in that they 
arguably have two key constituencies – their donors and their beneficiaries through a transfer 
rather than an exchange (MacQuillin 2016b). Yet because F-Reg is adopting a “consumer 
protection” regulatory ethos (ibid), there is a very real danger that primacy in ethical decision 
making will be given to the stakeholder group with the greatest capacity to influence the 
regulator rather than the full range of stakeholders that should properly be considered in this 
context. This potential imbalance is exacerbated now that development of the code in the UK 
has been vested in the regulator rather than the profession. 
 
We therefore recommend that a new ethical decision making framework now be 
operationalized and that those responsible for the writing of the Code and other ethical 
guidance apply this framework as they consider potential modifications. We also recommend 
that if the Code is to become a living code, adapting organically in response to changes in the 
environment, that ownership of the Code should be returned to the profession. The profession 
must in turn ensure that the Code is given greater prominence and consideration, not only in 
the minutiae of day-to-day decision making, but also in the development of fundraising 
strategy/culture and the management of all relevant (including supplier) relationships. In 



































































conducted in accordance with the principles of best practice we have alluded to above. It 
must be fit for purpose and fit for purpose for all relevant stakeholder groups. 
 
In this article we have argued that the rights of the beneficiary have to date been ignored and 
suggested an additional normative perspective on fundraising ethics (rights balancing) that 
could be applied. While this applies to how fundraisers tackle both day-to-day ethical 
dilemmas and those that exist at policy level (such as how to “frame” beneficiaries in 
marketing materials), this balance must also be struck in the domain of fundraising 
regulation. Otherwise there is a very real danger that in the rush to protect the interests of one 
vulnerable group in society we could do grave and permanent harm to another.  As La 
Follette  (1997, pp4-5) reminds us: 
 
“We must scrutinise our beliefs, our choices, and our actions to ensure that we a) are 
sufficiently informed, b) are not unduly swayed by personal interest and c) are not governed 
by the views of others. Otherwise we may perpetrate evils we could avoid, evils for which 
future generations will rightly condemn us.”  
 
To summarize our thoughts we might meaningfully adapt his last sentence to fundraising 
ethics: Otherwise we may not ask for donations we should have solicited, actions for which 
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Ethical theory Type Primary 
duty 
Other duties Compatible with Not compatible with 
Donorcentrism Consequentialist   Donor  Public trust 
 Organization 
 Rights balancing 
 Trustism 
 




Donorcentrism Deontological Donor  Public trust 
 Organization 
 Trustism 
 Service of 
philanthropy 





Consequentialist  Beneficiary 
 
 Donor 
 Public trust 
 Organization 
 Trustism  
 Donorcentrism 
(consequentialist) 











 Rights balancing 
Trustism Consequentialist  Public trust  Donor 
 Organization 
 Rights balancing 
 Donorcentrism 
 Service of 
philanthropy 
 None 
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